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Tablet computers (or tablet PCs) are a form of mobile personal computer with 
large, touch-sensitive screens operated using a pen, stylus, or finger; and the 
ability to recognize a user’s handwriting—a process known as “pen computing.”  
 
The first of these devices, which appeared at the end of the 1980s, generated a 
huge amount of interest in the computer industry, and serious amounts of 
investment money from venture capitalists. Pen computing was seen as the next 
wave of the silicon revolution, and the tablet computer was seen as a device 
everyone would want to use. It was reported in 1991 that “Nearly every major 
maker of computers has some type of pen-based machine in the works.”1  
 
Yet in the space of just a few years, the tablet computer and the notion of pen 
computing sank almost without a trace.2 Following a series of disastrous product 
launches and the failure of a number of promising start-up companies, the tablet 
computer was discredited as an unfulfilled promise. It no longer represented the 
future of mobile computing, but instead was derided as an expensive folly—an 
irrelevant sideline in the history of the computer.  
 
This article traces the early development of pen computing, the appearance, 
proliferation, and disappearance of the tablet computer, and explores possible 
reasons for the demise of this particular class of product.  
Product Failures in the History of Computing  
 
This article is concerned with the design, production, and consumption of 
artifacts, and the numerous factors which can affect their success or failure in 
the marketplace. For any company bringing a product to market, the amount of 
time and money invested in the research, design, and development of the 
product itself and in the market research, promotion, packaging, distribution, and 
retailing of a product means that an unsuccessful product launch is an extremely 
serious but unfortunately all too real prospect. The risk perhaps is 
understandably more common when the artifacts are complex technological 
products in a fiercely competitive field, and where the technology itself is still 
relatively young, not yet stable, and in a constant state of flux. Consequently, the 
historical development of the personal computer is (quite literally) littered with 
examples of products that have failed in the marketplace.  
 
Occasionally, because of poor manufacture, misdirected marketing or 
promotion, and software not meeting consumer expectations, some of these 
products could be said to have “deserved” to fail. However, advances in 
production technologies and quality control in recent years have reduced 
manufacturing failures (notwithstanding some very well publicized events such 
as the poor battery life of earlier “iPods,” the cracked screens of the first iPod 
“Nano,” and exploding batteries in some Sony laptops3). But despite advances in 
manufacturing quality, there still are numerous examples of well-designed 
products (often winning design awards) which were heavily promoted and 
performed as promised, yet still failed in the marketplace. Obviously, merely 
solving pragmatic problems is no guarantee of success.  
 
Product Failures and Theories of Technological Change  
 
A great deal has been written from a number of different perspectives about why 
technological products fail in the marketplace. These include economic and 
business analyses, marketing critiques, design critiques, and sociological 
enquiries. This body of work is far too large to describe in any depth here, but 
concludes that there are multiple reasons in each case for product failure in the 
marketplace.  
 
In The Invisible Computer, Donald A. Norman refers to the notion of “disruptive 
technologies”—technologies which have the ability to change people’s lives and 
the entire course of the industry.4 It is Norman’s contention that this ability to 
disrupt inherently produces products to which there initially is a large amount of 
resistance. Norman also believes that company attitudes, including internal 
politics, the preference for an existing, tried and tested market over the need to 
develop a new one, and the need to produce profits quickly rather than investing 
in new products which may take a number of years to reach maturity means that 
new technologies are not taken seriously enough.5  
 
Norman’s argument is that, in order to be accepted in the marketplace, three 
factors have to be right: the technology, the marketing, and user experience. As 
an example, he quotes the well-known story of the Xerox “Star” computer 
designed at Xerox PARC in the early 1980s. The Star was a product well ahead 
of its time, having the first commercially available graphical user interface (GUI), 
and a design philosophy of user interaction that set the standard for an entire 
generation of PCs. Unfortunately, it was a consumer product before the 
consumer existed. The product had not gone through the process of exposure to 
the marketplace, which normally occurs when a new technology appears, is 
accepted by “early adopters” of technology, and then is refined for the mass 
market. The same thing happened a few years later when Apple introduced the 
“Lisa”—a larger, more expensive precursor to the Macintosh. In both cases, the 
technology wasn’t quite ready. They both were painfully slow, had limited 
functionality because no one had written applications for them, and were 
extremely expensive. Therefore, there was no benefit for “early adopters” of 
technology in using these products, despite the novelty of the GUI , as the lack of 
application software meant that they didn’t do anything other computers couldn’t 
already do. The fate of the Star and the Lisa would have been shared by the 
Macintosh, had it not been saved by the advent of a “killer application,” making it 
indispensable to specific groups of users. This was desktop publishing software 
and the invention of the laser printer.6 Norman’s view is that the Star and the Lisa 
both had superb user experiences, but insufficient technology and marketing.7 
Not having all three was the reason for failure.  
 
This underscores the fact that the reasons for failure in the marketplace of any 
product are more complex than at first might be imagined. We will explore this 
notion in other theories that address the same issues.  
 
The theory of the social construction of technology takes the view that a complex 
range of factors are involved in the success of products, and that social factors 
have precedence in the process. As a counterpoint to a physical reality affecting 
outcomes (i.e., the technology itself), social constructionists see a web of 
relationships between people and between institutions that share beliefs and 
meanings as a collective product of a society, and that these relationships are 
the basis for subjective interpretations rather than physical or objective facts. 
The notion of the “truth” of a socially constructed interpretation or piece of 
knowledge is irrelevant—it remains merely an interpretation.8 It is an 
interpretation, though, which has significant agency.  
 
This is in direct contrast to the theory of technological determinism—the view 
that technology and technological change are independent factors, impacting on 
society from the outside of that society—and that technology changes as a 
matter of course, following its own path, and in doing so changes the society on 
which it impacts. (A good example is the notion of “Moore’s Law,” which states 
that the power of a microchip doubles every year as if it were a “natural” 
phenomenon). There is an element of truth contained within this, in that 
technological products do affect and can change our lives, but it is simplistic to 
imagine that other factors are not at play. Put more simply as “interpretive 
flexibility,” the argument of social constructionism is that different groups of 
people (i.e., different relevant social groups of users) can have differing views 
and understandings of a technology and its characteristics, and so will have 
different views on whether or not a particular technology “works” for them. Thus, 
it is not enough for a manufacturer to speak of a product that “works”: it may or 
may not work, depending on the perspective of the user.9  
 
The above arguments on social constructionism perhaps have been most widely 
promoted by the sociologists Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker,10 who use 
examples such as the developmental history of the bicycle to show how a linear, 
technological history fails to show the reasons for the success or failure of 
different models, and that a more complex, relational social model is required.  
 
A slightly different view is held by others, such as the historian of technology 
Thomas Hughes, who sees technological, social, economic, and political factors 
as parts of an interconnected “system.” In this instance, different but 
interconnected elements of products, the institutions by or in which they are 
created, and the environments in which they operate or are consumed are seen 
as a complete, interdependent network. However, a technological system 
remains a socially constructed one: “Because they are invented and developed 
by system builders and their associates, the components of technological 
systems are socially constructed artifacts.”11 There still is a distinction here 
between the human and nonhuman components of a system: “Inventors, 
industrial scientists, engineers, managers, financiers, and workers are 
components of but not artefacts in the system.” 12  
 
By comparison, Actor Network Theory, associated with the sociologists Bruno 
Latour, John Law, and Michael Callon, breaks down “the distinction between 
human actors and natural phenomena. Both are treated as elements in “actor 
networks.”13 In Actor Network Theory (ANT), all parts of a system or network are 
equally empowered as actors having an influence on technology—there is no 
distinction between small or large elements, animate or inanimate, or real or 
virtual. Technology is conceived of as a growing system or network. The actors 
(and the relationships between the actors) “shape and support the technical 
object.”14 An important aspect of the theory is that:  
 
The actor network is reducible neither to an actor or a network alone nor to a 
network. Like networks it is composed of a series of heterogeneous elements, 
animate and inanimate, that have been linked to one another for a certain period 
of time. The actor network can thus be distinguished from the traditional actors 
of sociology, a category generally excluding any nonhuman component and 
whose internal structure should not, on the other hand, be confused with a 
network linking in some predictable fashion elements that are perfectly well 
defined and stable, for the entities it is composed of, whether natural or social, 
could at any moment redefine their identity and mutual relationships in some 
new way and bring new elements into the network. An actor network is 
simultaneously an actor whose activity is networking heterogeneous elements 
and a network that is able to redefine and transform what it is made of.15 
 
In other words, the role of any particular actor in a network is not fixed, but 
indeterminate and changeable, being at times dominant or, at other times, 
insignificant in its agency.  
 
These theories are useful in the analysis of the introduction of complex new 
technologies, and the tablet computer is an excellent case in point, having a 
particular level of complexity. As a product, the tablet computer brought together 
a number of discrete technological advances, each having its own history of 
development: pen interfaces, handwriting recognition, and touchscreen 
technology.  
 
The History of Pen Computing: Early Developments in Pen 
Interfaces 
 
The principle of using a pen device rather than a keyboard to interact with a 
computer may appear to be a relatively recent development. As a matter of fact, 
pens were one of the earliest devices to be used in this way, many years before 
the invention of the computer mouse. Light pens (or light guns) were used in the 
experimental “Whirlwind” computer built at MIT between 1946 and 1949, when it 
became operational, for analyzing aircraft stability for the U.S. Navy. In this 
system, a light pen pointed at a symbol of an aircraft on a display screen 
produced identifying text about that aircraft. This machine formed the basis of 
the later TX-0 machine started in 1953 and the SAGE (Semi-Automatic Ground 
Environment) air defense system (Figure 1) started in 1958; both developed at 
MIT’s Lincoln Laboratories. In the SAGE system, the light gun was used to 
convert the “blip” on a cathode ray tube (CRT) showing the location of an aircraft 
or missile into X-Y coordinates. When a blip appeared, a “light gun” was pointed 
at that point on the screen, and an inter-nal photocell registered the blip. Since 
the time taken for the screen display to be refreshed was a known quantity, the 
time difference between the start of the screen refresh and the light gun 
registering a blip could be translated into an accurate X-Y position, and a 
trajectory then could be predicted.  
 
The TX-0 machine was the first in a series of experimental digital computers built 
at MIT, which included the 1958 TX-2— notably used by Ivan Sutherland in 1963 
to develop “Sketchpad”— the first computer drawing software, in which a light 
pen was used as the principal input/output device, initiating the “direct 
manipulation” of computer data (Figure 2). The abstract for Ivan Sutherland’s 
Ph.D. thesis describes the use of a pen to interact with a computer:  
 
The Sketchpad system uses drawing as a novel communication medium for a 
computer. The system contains input, output, and computation programs which 
enable it to interpret information drawn directly on a computer display. … A 
Sketchpad user sketches directly on a computer display with a light pen. The 
light pen is used both to position parts of the drawing on the display and to point 
to them to change them. A set of push buttons control the changes to be made 
such as erase, or move. Except for legends, no written language is used.16
  
 
The Development of Handwriting Recognition  
 
Concurrent with Sutherland’s development of the technology needed to draw 
items directly on a computer screen, others had been working on methods to 
enable computer users to directly write commands that could be interpreted by 
the computer as instructions. An early example of a device which could read 
stylus movements accurately enough to interpret handwriting was the RAND 
Tablet (Figure 3). After years of development, a 1964 memorandum booklet 
titled “The RAND Tablet: A Man-Machine Graphical Communication Device” 
prepared by the RAND Corporation for the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) stated:  
 
Early in the development of man-machine studies at RAND, it was felt that 
exploration of man’s existent dexterity with a free, pen-like instrument on a 
horizontal surface, like a pad of paper, would be fruitful. The concept of 
generating hand-directed, two-dimensional information on a surface not 
coincident with the display device (versus a “light pen”) is not new and has been 
examined by others in the field. It is felt, however, that the stylus-tablet device 
developed at RAND is a highly practical instrument, allowing further 
investigation of new freedoms of expression in direct communications with 
computers.17  
 
An example of an actual RAND Tablet in the archives of the Computer History 
Museum in Mountain View, California is, accompanied by an entry which reads:  
 
The Rand Corporation produced one of the first devices permitting the input of 
freehand drawings. Also called the Grafacon, the original Rand Tablet cost 
$18,000. The attached stylus sensed electrical pulses relayed through a fine 
grid of conductors housed beneath the drawing surface, fixing its position to 
within one one-hundredth of an inch. Many experimental systems were 
developed to recognize handwritten letters or gestures drawn on the tablet, such 
as Tom Ellis’ GRAphic Input Language (GRAIL) method of programming by 
drawing flowcharts.18
 
 
 
Tom Ellis was the author of a number of RAND reports describing the 
development, beginning with Ivan Sutherland’s “Sketchpad” research, of a 
system in which an operator could write instructional commands for a computer 
directly on the RAND Tablet:  
 
One fundamental facility of the man-computer interface is automatic recognition 
of appropriate symbols. The GRAIL system allows the man to print text and 
draw flowchart symbols naturally; the system recognizes them accurately in 
real-time. The recognizable symbol set includes the uppercase English 
alphabet, the numerals, seventeen special symbols, a scrubbing motion [a 
hand-drawn squiggle] used as an erasure and six flowchart symbols—circle, 
rectangle, triangle, trapezoid, ellipse, and lozenge.19  
 
Ellis’s GRAIL system was the beginning of handwriting recognition technology. 
Not only that, but since the system also contained text-editing facilities such as 
“character placement and replacement, character-string insertions, line 
insertions, character and character-string deletions, and line deletions” it formed 
the basis of word processing technology without the use of a keyboard.20  
 
Touchscreen Technology  
 
Touchscreen technology was first developed by Dr. Samuel Hurst while on leave 
from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to teach at the University of Kentucky.21 
His initial idea came in 1969, when he was looking for a way to digitize large sets 
of strip charts. Hurst and a graduate student (Jim Parks) made a 
two-dimensional digitizer by using two sheets of electrically conductive paper 
with a sheet of ordinary paper between as an insulator to create a sensor. By 
connecting two voltmeters—one to each conductor—a needle prick through the 
strip chart and the sensor supplied an x-coordinate to one voltmeter and, 
independently, a y-coordinate to the other. This initial invention became the 
“Elograph,” patented in 1972 (Figures 4 and 5). Returning to Oak Ridge and 
founding the company “Elographics” in 1971, Hurst went on to lead the 
development of transparent touchscreens, with the first produced in 1978, and 
five-wire resistive technology, the most commonly used form of touchscreen 
technology.22  
 
The first instruments were intended for the scientific market, and it was not a 
significant product because the “digital online” era had arrived and there was  
not a need for strip charts. It is amazing, in retrospect, that we survived long 
enough to take a poor product for the wrong market to an excellent product for a 
good (consumer) market. In a discussion with our patent agent, Martin Skinner, 
the idea emerged of a transparent touch screen for use with computers, and we 
were stimulated by Siemens when they paid some of the development costs for 
early units, but we did not have the insight to think that the touchscreen market 
would become so important.23  
 
Although they had some way to go until they were suitable for use in consumer 
products, these cutting-edge advances in human/ computer interaction meant 
that, by the end of the 1970s, all of the relevant technologies were in place and 
thoroughly documented to enable the development of the “tablet computer.” It 
actually took almost a decade until the appearance of the first tablet computer, 
although this requires some clarification of the definition of the product, as well 
as the acceptance of various streams of parallel development.  
 
Tablet Computers  
 
Tablet computers as revolutionary new products experienced a rapid rise in 
popularity and were the center of industry attention for a few years in the early 
1990s. Even though their popularity then underwent a massive decline, they did 
not disappear altogether, and still are manufactured today in limited quantities. 
Over the years, they have appeared in a number of forms but can be grouped 
into some general categories.  
 
Tablet computers that essentially are a large touchscreen covering a processor 
unit are referred to as “slates.” The input is purely through the screen via a stylus 
or finger, although external keyboards may be attached. The onboard processor 
allows a full range of computing capabilities. Where portability is a key concern, 
wireless versions with no onboard processors (called “thin-client slates”) also 
are available. These utilize applications stored on remote servers. The lack of 
keyboard input is associated with the main use of these tablets in specialized, 
“vertical” markets such as the healthcare industry or in sales and insurance field 
work, where the tendency is for standardized forms to be filled in rather than 
entering large amounts of text.  
 
“Convertibles” attempt to achieve the best features of tablet computers and 
laptop computers. The large touchscreens are movable, so that they can either 
act as a normal laptop with the keyboard in front of the screen, or be arranged so 
that the screen covers the keyboard completely, only allowing pen input. These 
have been more successful than slates, yet they remain a compromised 
product. The keyboard means that they inevitably are thicker and heavier than 
slates, and the touchscreen capability means they are more expensive than 
normal laptops. There also is a more expensive subset of convertibles known as 
“hybrids,” which have keyboards that can be completely detached, restoring the 
thin cross-section of slates. In this instance, the “tablet” part of the computer is 
the screen and processing unit, and the detachable keyboard can be seen as a 
peripheral component. The distinction might be an important one because, to be 
termed a true “tablet computer,” the screen input (the “tablet”) and processing 
unit (the computer), it could be argued, have to be contained within the same 
product rather than being a portable computer which, through an additional 
component, has screen-based input capability.  
 
So for clarification, the defining characteristics of the tablet PC are taken here as 
being a self-contained personal computer having a large, touch-sensitive screen 
and handwriting recognition capabilities to allow input by a stylus. With respect 
to size, tablet PCs have a screen size large enough to allow significant pen input 
(usually approaching that of a piece of A4 paper), and require both hands to 
operate if not rested on a stable surface. Although tablets may have the same 
organizational capabilities of “personal digital assistants” (PDAs), they have 
computing capabilities similar to desktop computers. The use of organizing 
software such as electronic calendars and alarms is not their primary function.  
 
The quote cited earlier in this article—that “Nearly every major maker of 
computers has some type of pen-based machine in the works.”—points to a 
serious problem for historians of the technology of this period, and requires the 
inclusion of a caveat. Researching the exact chronology of product releases in 
the field of portable computing from the late 1970s to early 1990s is fraught with 
difficulties, and not just because of the sheer amount of competing products that 
were available. Many products, especially those from smaller start-up 
companies (which in many cases essentially were one-man bands), were not 
promoted as widely as those from major manufacturers, and information 
concerning them is hard to find and even harder to accurately verify. In addition, 
major manufacturers in desperate competition at a time of rapid technological 
progress raced to launch short-lived products to such an extent that many of 
them were outdated as soon as they hit the market—and almost immediately 
replaced by updated versions. Moreover, in an attempt to gain a head start on 
competitors, products were routinely announced and promoted sometimes up to 
a year before their launch, by which time many already had been dropped in 
favor of a more advanced model, or failed to materialize because of technical, 
financial, or other problems. These products are known in the industry as 
“vaporware”—intended products that may have been prototyped but never 
actually were sold. There also is the issue of parallel development to take into 
account. Many of the features of these products were first developed in isolation 
at research institutes and universities, and widely disseminated as actual or 
theoretical possibilities that then were simultaneously adopted by different 
companies in their product development. So the issue who was “first” is a 
complicated one. Finally, many of the accounts of this period, as in this article, 
include oral histories from the individuals involved at the time. These individuals 
more often than not were simultaneously involved in numerous projects and, 
because of the fluidity of the market, often changed employers or started new 
companies without keeping detailed records. (They are, after all, largely 
engineers and entrepreneurs—not academics and historians.) It is quite 
common to discuss the same issues of product chronology and attribution with 
different people who were involved with the same project, at the same time, and 
obtain completely different versions of events. As Friedrich von Hayek said:  
 
The knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in 
concentrated or integrated form, but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete 
and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals 
possess.24  
 
For all the above reasons, it is practically impossible to be absolutely certain of 
all details, so the accuracy of dates and the completeness of chronologies of 
these products often are questionable. Therefore, the following chronology 
includes many of the key products, but certainly not all that appeared, especially 
if there was little difference between competing products launched 
simultaneously.  
 
Early Products  
 
Historically, the conceptual roots of the portable tablet computer as a discrete 
product are the same as those for the laptop computer, both arising from original 
interactive computer concepts proposed by Alan Kay as part of his doctoral 
thesis,25 and later developed by the Learning Research Group as the 
“Dynabook” at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) in the early 1970s 
(Figure 6).  
 
In 1968, while studying at Utah, Kay conceptualized a computer which brought 
together his work on interactive computing, the emerging technologies of 
flat-screen displays and handwriting recognition, and programming 
developments aimed at children. Kay explains:  
 
Ed Cheadle and I had been working on a desktop personal computer (the FLEX 
machine) since early 1967, and in the summer of 1968 I gave a presentation of 
this machine and software at the first ARPA grad students conference. One of 
the highlights was a visit to Don Bitzer’s lab where the first plasma panel flat 
screen display was being invented (with Owens Illinois). We saw a 
one-inch-square display that could light up a few pixels. Flat-screen displays 
were not a new idea either in fiction, semi-fiction (like Popular Science mag), 
and in the real technological world. Still, it was galvanizing to actually see the 
start of one!  
 
We knew the transistor count in the FLEX machine and some of the grad 
students and I sat around one afternoon estimating when those transistors could 
be put on the back of a big enough plasma panel. (Moore had announced the 
first version of his law in 1965.) Our estimate was about ten years.… At the 
same time, Peter Brodie at Westinghouse was also working on a flat panel using 
liquid crystals.26
  
 
Later the same summer, Kay visited researchers working on computers for 
nonprofessional users, including RAND, where Tom Ellis had developed his 
GRAIL system, and Seymour Papert (a pioneer in artificial intelligence) at a 
school in Lexington, where he was using his LOGO programming language 
developed for children.  
 
This was a transformative experience and on the plane back to Utah I started to 
think about making a computer for children that could combine some of the 
LOGO ideas, those of the FLEX machine, and the GRAIL tablet-based system. 
The ten-years-out problem became a non-problem because I realized there was 
at least ten years worth of user interface, software, and curriculum development 
that would have to be done.  
 
When I got to Utah I made a cardboard model of what such a machine would be 
like. (It was made hollow so we could load it up with lead pellets to see how 
heavy it could be made before it became a pain, etc.) It had slots on the side for 
the removable memory and the stylus.27  
 
This concept became one of the most radical product proposals of the time. In a 
paper produced by the Learning Research Group, Alan Kay and Adele Goldberg 
promoted the concept of the Dynabook as “A Dynamic Medium for Creative 
Thought”:  
 
Imagine having your own self-contained knowledge manipulator in a portable 
package the size and shape of an ordinary notebook. Suppose it had enough 
power to outrace your senses of sight and hearing, enough capacity to store for 
later retrieval thousands of page-equivalents of reference materials, poems, 
letters, recipes, records, drawings, animations, musical scores, waveforms, 
dynamic simulations, and anything else you would like to remember and 
change. We envision a device as small and portable as possible which could 
both take in and give out information in quantities approaching that of human 
sensory systems.28  
 
Quite clearly, such a computer was not technically possible at the time (Kay still 
thinks this is true29), and yet his vision of the Dynabook was so powerful that it 
drove the development of computing technology inexorably towards truly 
portable computing. Even the name has been inspirational and much emulated. 
A company called “Dynabook Technologies” was set up in 1987 to develop such 
a computer, and gained $37 million in financial backing yet never managed to 
overcome technical problems and went bankrupt in 1990,30 and Toshiba 
appropriated the name for its early pen tablets, marketed as “Dynapads.”31  
 
A number of products have laid claim to being or have been hailed as “the first 
tablet computer.” However, with respect to the definition laid out above, many of 
these have one or another characteristic missing. Some products had character 
recognition rather than full handwriting recognition; while others were not 
self-contained products, but had to be connected either directly by cable or by 
radio signals to remote processing units or servers. This is an important 
distinction in design terms because in a unit where the touchscreen is a separate 
component connected by a cable, it can act as a peripheral input device rather 
than an intrinsic part of the product form. These factors are important in charting 
the development of tablet computers as a discrete class of products.  
 
The first to bring together the three technologies of pen interfaces, handwriting 
recognition, and touchscreens into a consumer product was Dr. Ralph Sklarew. 
His product, the “Write-Top” (Figure 7), built in 1987 by Linus Technologies, was 
“arguably the first portable computer with handwriting recognition.”32 It certainly 
had all the capabilities of a tablet computer, although it was not termed as such 
at the time. However, even though it was prototyped as a self-contained unit, the 
production version (designed by Peter H. Muller of Inter4m) “was a two-part 
design tethered via a cable.” 33 It came close to being a self-contained unit since 
the touchscreen element could be “latched” onto the base unit to create a “grey 
sandwich.”34  
 
Sklarew founded Linus Technologies in 1985 with $11 million in venture capital. 
They demonstrated their first version to a number of interested parties, including 
GRiD Systems (see below).35 He and his partners received patents for a 
“Handwritten keyboardless entry computer system,” and sold approximately 
1,500 units before closing in 1990.36  
 
Self-contained Tablet Computers  
 
The first successful attempt at a self-contained tablet computer appeared in the 
form of the GRiDPad from GRiD Systems, conceived by Jeff Hawkins (Figure 8). 
GRiD Systems was the company that produced the first true laptop computer, 
the GRiD Compass, launched in 1982.37 Hawkins states that he came up with 
the idea of a tablet computer with a stylus interface in 1987, while studying 
neuroscience at UC Berkeley during a two-year leave of absence from GRiD. 
“During a neural networking conference, a company called ‘Nestor’ 38 
demonstrated their handwriting recognition software which was based on 
pattern recognition algorithms. I realized that this could best be put to use in a 
mobile computer.” 39 In the fall of 1987, Hawkins went to an interview with GO 
Corporation, a promising start-up company, to see if this was the best place to 
take the idea forward. GO saw itself as a pen-computing business, which 
worried Hawkins: “There’s no such thing as a ‘pen-computing’ business— you 
just need a PC with an additional stylus. You don’t have ‘mouse computing’ as a 
core business. The point is mobile computing, not pen computing.” 40 Hawkins 
believed that GO would fail. Instead, he took the idea with him to GRiD in 1988, 
and managed the GRiDPad project there; employing IDEO to do the industrial 
design.41 The GRiDPad was deliberately targeted at specialist, vertical markets 
such as the medical profession because this is where Hawkins saw market 
opportunities. “I never saw pen computers as a replacement for a full PC as GO 
did. GO was really pushing pens—they lost all sense of reality. They never 
shipped, whereas the GRiDPad turned over in excess of $30 million in its best 
year.” 42  
 
The GO computer is a significant piece of “vaporware” if only for the sheer size 
of the endeavor and amount of publicity that accompanied it. The idea for the 
product arose during a business flight shared by Mitchell Kapor (founder of 
Lotus Development Corporation) and Jerry Kaplan, when they had the 
equivalent of a “religious epiphany” 43 that a portable pen-driven computer could 
solve all the traveling executive’s information- handling problems. Kaplan went 
on to found GO Corporation in August 1987.  
 
The product was developed to the stage of a working but deskbound prototype 
of connected components by 1988, yet despite having received in total more 
than $75 million in financial backing and the enthusiastic support of IBM and 
AT&T, it suffered all kinds of engineering setbacks. A working preproduction 
version was not assembled until June 1989 44 (Figure 9). The final product, with 
industrial design work by Paul Bradley of Matrix Design and mechanical 
engineering by David Kelly Design (both later to become IDEO) was done in 
1991, by which time the company had changed direction to concentrate on their 
handwriting recognition interface software called “PenPoint.” This put them in 
direct competition with Microsoft, and when Microsoft launched “Windows for 
Pen Computing,” a huge public relations battle ensued.45 Not surprisingly, GO 
lost. Kaplan went on to write an autobiography in which he said: “The real 
question is not why the project died, but why it survived as long as it did.” 46 GO 
was taken over by AT&T in 1994, and eventually shut down.  
 
GO wasn’t the only company that thought the ideal pen-computing operating 
system was yet to be created. In 1991, the computer magazine BYTE ran a 
review article on yet another new product (Figure 10) aiming to set the standard:  
 
Many players in the nascent pen-based computing market see the transition 
from conventional notebooks to pen systems as a chance to bypass the DOS 
standard and start afresh with more modern technology. Although the era of 
pen-based systems has barely begun, there are already three competing 
operating environments. This mad scramble to set new software to norms for 
pen computers may be a rude shock to users comfortable with the uniformity of 
DOS.  
 
In the midst of all this uncertainty, a fourth environment has arrived from start-up 
Momenta. One of the most widely anticipated entrants to the market, Momenta’s 
pen-based laptop sports a new GUI that represents yet another effort to define 
the look and feel of pen computing.  
 
The Momenta computer is different in other ways, too. The company is aiming it 
at mobile executives, not at the blue-collar and field workers who have until now 
been the target audience for pen-based PCs. Perhaps most surprising, 
Momenta is playing down the role of handwriting recognition in the system, 
saying that the technology is too immature to substitute for a keyboard in many 
cases. Instead, Momenta sees the pen, in conjunction with its new GUI, as a 
more intuitive substitute for a mouse.47  
 
The competition was indeed tough. Although it was in many respects a radical 
product and had many innovative features leading to its appearance on the 
covers of twenty magazines, Momenta International ceased trading in 1992, less 
than a year after the Momenta Pentop’s launch. In an article reflecting on his 
career, the company’s founder, Kamran Elahian, said “We set out to create a 
computer that would be incredibly easy to use. I was absolutely convinced that 
we would revolutionize the PC industry.” The same article concluded: “There 
was just one problem. No one bothered to build a market for pen-based 
computers. In three years, Momenta burned through $40 million.… For a while 
at least, Elahian held the Valley’s title for burning the most capital in the shortest 
period of time. Momenta was a monumental flop.” 48  
 
A spinoff from GO, called EO Inc. (also sold to AT&T), had some success with 
two versions of products called “Personal Communicators” in 1993. These units, 
with industrial design work by frog design, had a built-in modem to provide 
phone, fax, and electronic mail capabilities. The smaller-screened version, the 
EO 440 (Figure 11), sold around 10,000 units, but the company collapsed 
shortly after launching the larger-screened EO 880.49 Before it collapsed, the 
company was working on various future possibilities, including a tablet computer 
with speech recognition.  
 
After his success with the GRiDPad, Jeff Hawkins tried to develop a product 
“that offered the best of both the laptop and tablet.”50 The result, with industrial 
design work by IDEO, was the GRiD Convertible, launched in 1993 (Figure 12). 
This used a clever mechanism which allowed the screen to slide and pivot to 
cover the keyboard and convert the laptop into a tablet. “Bill Gates loved it. It 
failed in the market place. I learned at that time that people didn’t really want to 
write on their display.” 51 Hawkins realized that “people wouldn’t pay for or 
compromise the quality of a laptop for a pen interface.” 52  
 
Divergence  
 
Around 1993, the closely related products of tablet computers and Personal 
Digital Assistants began to move apart. Apple ran a whole series of projects 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s to develop tablet computers, most of 
which were cancelled.53 These included a notebook-sized, slate-type computer 
concept codenamed “Figaro” between 1987 and 1991 (which evolved into the 
Newton), the PenMac, the Macintosh Folio, and SketchPad, all in 1992; and the 
WorkCase and Newton MessageSlate in 1993. Apple felt that a tablet computer 
might compete with and divert sales from the Macintosh, so the project was 
rethought as a PDA.54  
 
The Apple Newton MessagePad eventually was unveiled in May 1992 at the 
Consumer Electronics Show with a large-scale publicity drive claiming to have 
produced the “future of computing.” It was released the following year, 
unfortunately to weak reviews. After a number of redesigns culminating in the 
MessagePad 2000 (Figure 13), the technology was placed into the Apple eMate 
laptop computer in 1997, and then discontinued altogether in 1998. Although it 
was produced for six years and won numerous design awards, the Newton was 
never the success Apple hoped for, and the goal of reinventing personal 
computing was never achieved. Although it was marketed as a PDA rather than 
a tablet computer, the unit itself was too large to fit into any pocket, was 
expensive (the final models costing $1,000), and initially suffered from poor 
handwriting recognition software, which many regard as the main reason for its 
failure.55  
 
The End of the Line?  
 
The Apple Newton would seem to mark the point at which the tablet computer 
developed into the Personal Digital Assistant. Some manufacturers did continue 
to produce true tablet computers, but with little success. The original IBM 
“ThinkPad” in 1993 was a tablet computer, and Sony produced a Pen Tablet PC 
in 2001, but it was discontinued due to low sales only a year later.56 Despite this, 
a number of manufacturers including IBM and HP still produce a variety of 
models,57 and Bill Gates openly defends them, predicting they soon will come 
into their own as products, and ensuring that the latest version of Windows, 
“Vista,” supports pen computing.  
 
The story of the tablet computer to date covers some fifty years from its 
conception, with real products being produced for twenty years. The sheer 
amount of money and effort involved in trying to bring the tablet computer to the 
marketplace is staggering. As a product group, they have swallowed billions of 
dollars in investment capital and thousand upon thousands of man-hours in 
R&D, design, and promotion. Sales remain pitifully low, and yet manufacturers 
and a small number of users still cling to the concept, convinced of its potential. 
At Microsoft, the tablet PC is most prominently promoted by one man, Bert 
Keely, who has the title “Architect, Mobile PCs & Tablet Technology.” Keely 
constantly attends research seminars and computer shows, and appears in the 
news media demonstrating the advantages of pen computing. He admits that 
tablet technology has a number of flaws and a long way to go,58 but remains 
convinced that the future of pen computing will be “astounding.” 59  
 
Conclusions  
 
So why has the tablet computer not been a successful product? In theory, it had 
it all—a computer that you could use as if it was a pad of paper. As proposed by 
the theories discussed earlier, there always will be more than one reason for any 
product failure. Yet many of the factors mentioned in the case study as to why 
certain individual tablet computers had failed are issues which subsequently 
have been resolved. Clearly, the technical problems which plagued early 
products such as slow processor speeds and software reliability have been 
overcome. The compatibility of software means that applications for such 
computers are far greater in number and, while still not perfect, issues of 
functionality such as the reliability and accuracy of handwriting recognition 
software have been greatly improved. The manufacturers currently involved are 
not start-up enterprises lacking in financial support or backing; and the products 
are now part of large ranges of computing equipment from well-known and 
respected companies, and have received marketing support of a suitably high 
level. Yet despite the sales predictions and assurances from Bill Gates, and the 
enthusiastic promotion of people such as Bill Keely, tablet computers still 
account for less than five percent of the personal computer market.60  
 
Social constructionism suggests that a complex range of social factors are the 
most significant elements to take into account in the success or failure of 
technological products. Indeed, it would appear from the technical factors that 
have been resolved that the only possible barriers left to the acceptance of tablet 
computers are social ones. The concept of “interpretive flexibility” proposes that 
different groups of people have different views on the extent to which a particular 
technology “works” for them. However “natural” a form of communication writing 
may appear to be, perhaps, as Jeff Hawkins believes, people don’t want to write 
on computer screens, and a pen on a large display is not a good user interface 
for a computer.61 The feel of pen on paper is a difficult one to surpass.  
 
Some of the technology still isn’t solved. Paper still has qualities screens don’t 
have. Is the stylus active or passive? If it is active, then they are a problem. The 
screen resolution still isn’t good enough, and there is still a parallax issue. 
Handwriting recognition still isn’t good enough: text editing is still complex to 
use.62  
 
According to Stuart Card, a research scientist at Palo Alto Research Center and 
an expert in human/computer interaction, the problem of pen computing is 
self-evident, and revolves around the difficulty of overcoming the physical 
keyboard:  
 
The reason pen computing doesn’t work well is that the software it works with 
was designed to be used with a mouse and keyboard—the pen input was added 
later. PenPoint [the operating system developed by GO] was better as it was 
gesture-based. This means going back to recall rather than recognition [having 
to learn and remember how to execute a command rather than intuitively 
interpreting an icon] but that’s okay as long as there are a limited number of 
gestures, say around five to ten, and the gestures are mimetic rather than 
symbolic. As an example, it’s difficult to spreadsheet with a mouse. It could be 
easier with a pen if the design of the software works. Currently it is just as 
difficult to use a pen, or more so as you also have to include handwriting 
recognition errors. Another is writing URLs [Website addresses]. Handwriting 
recognition software has algorithms to ignore “nonsense” words, but URLs are 
random series of letters and no spaces, so that doesn’t work. The pen clearly 
has an advantage if the input is a drawing, but how many people use that? And 
virtual keyboards are useless for typing—only one key at a time. You will always 
need a keyboard for bulk text input.63  
 
Another factor could involve the complexity of a personal computer, which is 
clearly accepted if not desired in a desktop PC. This may not be acceptable in 
such a portable format as the tablet PC. Slow start-up times, large size and 
weight, and the compromises inevitable in multifunctional products such as a full 
computer do not cross over well to situations in which the computer is held and 
carried around by the user, and constantly turned on and off.  
 
It is possible that the semantic associations of tablet computers and the body 
language employed when using them is an issue. In use, tablets tend to be 
carried in the cradle of one arm and written upon with the free hand in much the 
same manner people write on clipboards (indeed, some tablets such as those by 
“Aqcess” have been designed with detailing to specifically connote physical 
clipboards). The success of tablet computers in vertical markets suggests that 
this was not an issue for users carrying out specialized field work with “rugged” 
products, where the clipboard was and is a commonly used and accepted piece 
of equipment, but it may possibly have been an issue when attempts were made 
by companies such as Momenta to overtly move tablets into the executive 
market.64  
 
Factors such as these, which may appear to be small problems, or even 
insignificant by some, are held by Actor Network Theory to have the potential to 
be highly significant in the successful take-up of new products. The interesting 
aspect of ANT, though, is the understanding that the significance of these 
factors is not seen as fixed, but fluid. At any moment, any factor can move from 
being a significant actor to an insignificant one, or vice versa, even as the result 
of forces outside of the network itself. With this level of uncertainty in mind, it 
must be recognized that the current public attitude toward tablet computers and 
to pen computing itself theoretically could change at any moment, however 
unlikely that may seem.65  
 
While the tablet computer has failed to capture the public’s imagination, the PDA 
has succeeded—but that’s another story. The reasons for the failure of tablet 
computers, as for any complex technological product, are not straightforward. All 
or any one of the reasons above; or a combination of small details which 
together constitute the nature of the experience of using a tablet computer, could 
be equally responsible. As social construction theory would have it, the acid test 
of computing equipment is not the technology, but user acceptance. And as 
Actor Network Theory shows, however small or inconsequential an agent may 
appear to be in the overall scheme of things, it still can have the ability to make 
or break any product.  
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